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DENVER. OCTOBER. 1927

Next Regular Meeting
TIME: Monday, October 3, 1927, at 12:15 P. M.
PLACE: Chamber of Commerce Dining Room.
OCCASION: Regular monthly meeting, in honor of
41 newly admitted lawyers who will be sworn in
that morning at 9:30 A. M. in the Supreme Court
Room.
SPEAKERS: In the absence of Chief Justice H. P.
Burke, Acting Chief Justice John H. Denison
will welcome the new members of the Bar on
behalf of the Supreme Court.
Donald H. McCreery, President of the Colorado Bar Association will welcome them on behalf of that Association.
Hon. Charles S. Thomas will deliver the
principal address.
BE ON TIME
Adjournment promptly at 1:45.
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Editorial Policy For The Coming Year
new Association Officers the
ITH the inauguration of the
incoming board of the Record
desires to make the following brief
announcement and statement of policy.
The Record is pleased to announce. the
appointment by President Stearns of
Messrs. Sidney Moritz, Jr., and Rodney
J. Bardwell, Jr., to the Board of Editors.
The Board as now constituted, comprises two former editors and two new
ones.
If acceptable to Association
Presidents hereafter, it is designed by
such provision to initiate a permanent
policy whereby two junior editors are
appointed each year automatically becoming the two senior members at the
end of the year, the two seniors automatically retiring after a year of service as such.

For the ensuing year the Record will
follow its policies of the year last past
in regard to form and character of
content.
Numbers on Special Law Subjects
will appear as last year.
The cooperation of the Bar is solicited in one especial particular, which
should be a labor of love to a profession nurtured in argument and dedicated to controversy. The Record desires to afford a forum for the expression of the views of individual members on subjects of interest polemical
or otherwise. Personalities direct and
indirect must, of course, be barred and
demands of space must be met; but
apart from that you are most sincerely
invited to air your talents, your contentions, and your grievances iR the
Record.
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The September Meeting
iONDAY, September 12th found
the travelers returned from the
DkArecent American Bar Association convention at Buffalo back in full
force at the luncheon meeting at the
Chamber of Commerce.

C. Pollock, and Judge George C.
Scott constituting the bench of the
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals then
sitting, also Mr. E. E. McInnis of
Chicago, and Mr. Henry'P. Brown of
Boston.

The Man from the National Chamber
Somewhat before the members
present had partaken of dessertPresident Stearns introduced Mr. John L.
Powell of Washington, D. C., as a
representative of the National Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Powell indicated in some brief remarks the
origin and functions of his constituent organization and solicited the
support of the legal profession in the
advancement of its offices. Among
the points of interest made by Mr.
Powell, were his references to the
beginnings of the Chamber in 1912
at the suggestion of Mr. Taft, the
then President, the successful functioning and eulogistic reception by
all presidents since then, including
Mr. Coolidge, the slogan of the organization "never to favor anything
for business which is not good for
the whole country;" and finally the
speaker's esteem for the legal profession and the reliance of his organization upon the bar, as evidenced by
the fact that two of the eight presidents of that body were lawyers.

Iliad and Odyssey
The Chair then indulged in some
entertaining reminiscences and statistics in regard to the Buffalo convention from which he had but recently returned. He said that there
was a large Colorado delegation conThe
sisting of sixteen members.
registration, he said, was somewhat
less than the Denver meeting and he
then enumerated in some detail
Among
some of the proceedings.
the items of local interest he referred to the election of Mr. W. L. Boatwright to the office of President of
the Association of Attorney-Generals
Some discussion was had of the functioning and difficulties of these various "Sections of the association"
each dedicated to a particular branch
of law. He characterized as historic
the introduction of the Lord Chief
Justice of England by Chief Justice
Taft of the United States Supreme
Applause greeted the anCourt.
nouncement that Mr. James Grafton
Rogers of the Denver Bar had been
honored by election to one of the
trusteeships in the national association.

v

Mr. Stearns Presides
Upon calling the regular meeting
to order, Mr. Stearns commented upon the fact that this was, the first
meeting of the current year, that the
policy would be continued of having
a regular monthly meeting on the
first Monday of each month.
The Chair felicitated the gathering upon the presence of a number
of distinguished visitors including
Judge Robert E. Lewis, Judge John

Herald of Uniformity
The Chair then introduced Mr.
Forrest Northcutt as one of the delegates to the Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Mr. Northcutt, after briefly outlining
the origin and procedure of the conference, mentioned the representative character of the membership including judges and law professors of
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national reputation. The conference,
he said, had reported suggested legislation upon the subjects of "Real Es
tate Mortgages" as a new proposal
and amendments to the subjects of
"Motor Vehicles" and "Chattel Mortgages". The text of the suggested
laws upon "Business Corporations,"
"Trust Receipts," and "Public Utilities" were considered section by
section discussed and approved-the
procedure being, according to Mr.
Northcutt, to pass report of final
recommendation of these proposed
laws only after a year's further consideration. As evidence of the careful consideration allotted these recommendations, he noted that the
Business Corporations act had been
under consideration for 15 years and
the Real Estate Mortgages act considered upon six different occasions.
He advanced some interesting statistical information upon this subject noting that the conference had
been in existence for thirty-five years
during which time 42 proposed uniform laws had been recommended.
Of these only the "Negotiable Instruments" law had been enacted by all
the States-the warehouse receipts
act being second in popularity. If
all 42 laws had been universally
adopted, in excess of 2 thousand enactments would have been required,
whereas approximately 400 represented the total number actually
made law to date, of which only
three states have adopted as many as
eighteen. The greater proportion of
these acts have dealt with subjects
of commerce-254 in number. Social
legislation on the other hand, being
the proposed Child Labor, Workmen's Compensation etc., enactments,
have been poorly received. Under the
circumstances it was manifest that
the need was to procure a response
upon the work on the conference already done and not to proceed with
new proposals of law. In this con-
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nection Mr. Gilbert H. Montague,
chairman of the analagous committee of the New York Bar Association,
was quoted by Mr. Northcutt as calling attention to the function of the
proposed laws as affording models
of legislative form even where not
so generally accepted as to have the
attribute of national uniformity.
The tendering of these enactments
to some legislatures was likened by
Mr. Northcutt to the biblical casting
of pearls to which he hastened,
amidst laughter, to except the legislature of his home state. He closed
with a comment upon the impracticability of the present adoption by
Colorado of the mortgage act. The
conference, helped, he said, to keep
the subject of uniformity before the
state legislatures, rather than to let
it go to the Federal Congress. In
closing he referred to the hospitable
entertainment tendered by the Erie
county lawyers.
Wallbank on Miscellany
Mr. Stanley Wallbank was then
introduced as one of the representatives at the conference of the Bar
Association delegates. Mr. Wallbank
after a statement to the effect that
his voice was lame and almost sick
and was like the Volstead act "in
need of assistance and enforcement,"
delivered himself of his report in
dulcet tones which entirely belied
his self deprecatory utterance. He
said that the conference of the Bar
Association delegates was not unlike
the convention of the "Sections" on
specific law subjects to which Mr.
Stearns had previously made reference: that its function was to devise and supervise contact between
the American Bar Association and
the local associations of the various
states; that it sprung from the effort
of Messrs. Elihu Root and others
to create a forum for the study and
recommendation of helpful sugges-
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tions for local bar association activities. In this character, it had been
graced by many chairmen of impressive abilities among whom were Mr.
Root, Mr. Davis and Mr. Hughes as
well as Mr. McChesney of Chicago
who was the chairman at this conferMr. Wallbank reviewed a
ence.
paper by Mr. McChesney on the leadership of the Bar, its waning influences, the causes and remedies. Mr.
McChesney decried the over weening
influence of the corporation client.
He referred to the time when the
corporation president, upon desiring
advice, donned his top hat and went
to the lawyer, in contrast to the
present arrangement where the same
president now presses a button and
the lawyer comes to him. It was
the view of Mr. McChesney that the
bar should assert its position.
Mr. Wallbank recounted the report of the Committee on Rules of
Court, of which Mr. Marvel of Delaware was the chairman. The report was described as elaborately
digesting the powers of the judiciary
in each state and ending with the
recommendations of the committee.
The report of Mr. Grinnell of Boston, Chairman of the Committee of
Judicial Councils was summarized
by Mr. Wallbank as narrating the
helpfulness of these bodies in various of the states. The conference,
he reported, voted for the merger of
these two committees.
He referred to the report of Judge
Barth of St. Louis, Chairman of the
Committee on Judicial Selection and
the unfinished report of Mr. Dodd of
Chicago on Requirements for Admission as well as an interesting report
and discussion by Mr. Sheriff of
Chicago on Cooperation between Bar
and Press, mentioning editorials in
the Chicago Tribune and the New
York World themselves deprecating
the trial of criminal causes in the
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newspapers, describing such conduct
as "Journalistic Lynch Law". The
report of Mr. Goodwin of Chicago, 18
years Chairman of the Committee
on State Bar Organization, was deas provocative of "fire
scribed
Reference being made to
works."
the organization of five states: North
Dakota, Alabama, Idaho, New Mexico and California, Messrs. Taft and
Marshall of New York City were described as vigorously urging the exclusively local character of interest
entailed in such a discussion-the
former calling up the record of vote
of previous conferences to that effect
and the latter further emphasizing
the peculiarities of the Manhattan
situation of 25 thousand members in
the state bar, 20 thousand in the
City, and the distinction between
the city and county association all as
evidence of the peculiar metropolitan
To
problem in this connection.
these matters, answer was had from
Mr. Cohen of that city. As a result
the report was ordered filed and the
personnel of the committee thereafter to be designated by the Chairman of the council. Mr. Wallbank
referred to a unique device in judicial selection reported by Mr. Ridgeway of California whereby the California bar was permitted to vote upon any judicial candidate either for
or against or without opinion. Mr.
Wallbank named the new officers of
this Section and referred to the
record attendance of this branch of
the convention.
Legislators
The Chair then called upon Mr.
Henry W. Toll to report the progress
of the conference of the American
Legislators Association which owed
its paternity to Mr. Toll and had
honored him with important official
position at its head and the chair
in this oonnection made felicitous
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reference to the sign on the Ford "I
do not choose to run in 1928".
Mr. Toll described the assemblage
as a national clearing house, not
only for legislation, but also for
after dinner stories and he regaled
the luncheon with some of those anecdotes. Among these were the story
attributed to Mr. Silas Straun about
the private whose sergeant had not
exactly called him "a block-head",
but had told him to pull down his
cap because the woodpeckers were
coming. There appeared the ubiquitous oratorical bore who, after the
delivery of a stereoptican lecture
found only one member of the audience when the lights went up, as to
whom, inquiry developed his reason
for staying to have been that he was
to give the next speech on the program. Answers to questions upon
examination for admission to the
Bar were cited disclosing that
Disraeli was the Archbishop of Canterbury and Magna Charta a first
class battleship. Professor Williston
was credited with the account of the
auto accessory purchaser who inquired for a horn which need not be
loud but must have a "mean contemptuous snarl."
Inter Alia
Many expressions were made, Mr.
Toll said, of the cordial appreciation
to the American Bar Association
delegates of the hospitality which
they had enjoyed at the Denver meeting of the year previous. Mr. Toll
made complimentary reference to
the Denver Bar Association as "the
first godfather of the Legislators'
Association."
Referring to legislative activity and the previous reference of Mr. Northcutt, Mr. Toll
disclaimed any intention to "trample on the. pearls of uniformity or
turn again and rend." Among the
interesting personal references to
which Mr. Toll gave voice in his re-

port was the account of a talk with
Professor Wigmore so engrossing as
to keep both the Professor and the
speaker in the ante chamber during
one entire session. At the end of
the talk, however, the Professor expressed himself to be a complete
convert.
Six Points
Mr. Toll very lucidly expressed
the six functions of the legislators
organization to be as follows: first,
as a "clearing house" for the legislative reference bureaus dedicated
to research and drafting of proposed
statutes in the light of the best
thought on the subject obtainable
anywhere in the country; second, as
"an informational switchboard" to
connect the legislative draftsman
with the best source of information
in the United States on the subject
of his proposed statute; third, as a
"bulletin" to the 7500 legislators in
the United States coming to them
between sessions "when the orgy was
not in progress;" fourth, as "an annual conference for legislators open
to good, bad and indifferent alike".
Mr. Toll estimated that between one
third and one-fifth of all legislators
are lawyers and that of these perhaps 10% might be induced annually to combine the American Bar
Association convention with the
meeting under discussion; fifth, the
"meeting of the legislative assembly," consisting of 96 representatives
of the State legislature being one
representative from each branch and
each State, is designed to bring legislation closer to the source of information by the removal of intermediaries. As an example the speaker
referred to the benefits of the direct
expressions to this body of Professor Williston on the Negotiable Instruments act. It also finds a utility
according to Mr. Toll by effecting
an interstate legislative cordiality
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in anticipation of compacts between
the States similar to that involved
in the Colorado River situation;
sixth, and finally, the organization
would design to derive the advan-
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tage of the specialist and expert
through committees on special subjects as for example "taxation."
V. A. M.

The Constitution and Dynamic Sociology
By VICTOR ARTHUR MILLER, of the Denver Bar

N pursuance of the policy of the
RECORD to afford opportunity for
discussion by the members of the
Denver Bar Association on topics controverted or otherwise, the colleagues
of the writer on the board have afforded this opportunity for the expression
of certain views of his own stimulated
by the recent celebration of Constitution Week.
It is not the function of this article
to indulge in eulogy upon the Constitution nor to attempt any instruction
or analysis upon any of the great precepts of Federal organization. Such expression, if directed to a group of
lawyers , would be a work of supererogation.
It is proposed to discuss, and that
not particularly in accordance with
any traditional treatment, the single,
greatest and most characteristic feature of the fundamental organ of our
government.
The one preeminent
principle in the American Constitution, the one consideration for which,
above all others, it is worshipped by its
friends and execrated by its enemies,
is its militant protection of individual
man.

Few would disagree with Dean
Pound that the authorship of the constitutional principle in our polity
which protects the individual is in the
alliance of the Puritan and Pioneer
with the classic economic and social
philosopher of the eighteenth Century,
the proponent. of the laissez faire doctrine. Certainly, so far as argument
can proceed in personam, no truth was

ever discovered in a h appier atmosphere than the mental background of
the three characters thus named. The
Puritan and particularly the American
Puritan, Burke's "Essence of Dissent"
was, as is agreed by all historians of
the frontier, concentrated to a selective type of an even higher order in
point of courage, brains and energy as
he pushed settlement to the West. He
was therefore the very cream of the
cream of all ancestral stock on earth
and, to his iron virtues of enterprise,
self-reliance, thrift, and endurance was
added the humanitarian thought of
the intellectual giants of a humanitarian era-blending in the authorship of
the Constitution.
Nor can the most vigorous opponent
of the individualist policy of the
American Constitution deny to it, its
external effect in times past as a beneficent, if not vitally necessary element, in developing our country and
protecting it from the tribulations of
other lands at other times. It cannot
be doubted from a historical standpoint that unrestrained power over
the individual vested in any kind of
government has through all the centuries proven to be an abysmal failure.
This is true whether the government
was an absolute monarchy or an absolute democracy an oligarchy or mob
rule. From the massacre by ballot of
the Athenian generals after the battle
of Aegospotamos through the religious
persecutions of Louis XIV and James
II, an unbridled legal authority of man
over man has resulted in governmen-
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tal oppression, robbery, and assassination and, as Macaulay has said, filled
the jails with men and women of whom
the world was not worthy. It is unnecessary to multiply facts on this historical generality, we take it that it
would be admitted to be true beyond
denial or dispute. Further, historically speaking, we believe that it would
probably be undisputed likewise that,
from an economic standpoint, the development of our own country-at any
rate to anything approaching its present proportions-would have been impossible except for the sheltering arm
of a fundamentally individualistic
form of government.
Narratively speaking, therefore, impartial history, the unanimity of belief
in individualist tenets in American
habits of thought together with support in the more obvious economic
phenomena of current existence have,
by great men past, always been regarded as ample justification for fixing
an individualistic character on the
highest law of the land and making
that character of constitutional limitation a practical protection against
oppression by any form of government
whether or not supported by a majority
of voters and whether or not backed
by immediate popular opinion and in
the teeth, if need be, of alleged social
demand.
The Constitutional view of the individualist has been epitomized by the
great Judge Mathews in defense of the
despised Chinese in the memorable
language:
"The fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those
maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the
race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the
reign of just and equal laws, so
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that, in the famous language of
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights,
the government of the commonwealth 'may be a government of
laws and not of men.''"
Now it was never to be doubted that
a system which professedly aims to
exact a full measure of individual
justice irrespective of the popular
viewpoint would sooner or later incur
the displeasure of some people.
It is believed that these people fall
roughly into three classes. The first
class is composed of the revolutionaries who openly oppose and desire
the subversion of the Constitution.
In the second, there are many good
citizens of an acerbic classification
who cannot be bothered with the Constitution and hence ignore it. Some of
these persons are constituted of a
simple and fortunate mental condition
of appetite untroubled by scruple.
They would not steal their neighbor's
horse because of the police, they
would not openly oppose the Constitution, because it would be an unpopular
view and too much trouble; but if
they can affiliate their lust for neighbor's horse with an alleged societary
demand, steal it safely, comfortably
and by vote they are more than well
content. Another portion of this group
entertains a sincere conscientious respect for neighbor's property in the
horse; but their mental limitations are
such that they cannot conceive him
wronged unless the horse be taken by
direct robbery vi et armis. The slightest obliquity and particularly the governmental cloak in the form of the
pillage, from a moral standpoint, alters
the whole situation with them.
Neither of these classes can be regarded as
particularly
impressive
enemies of individual rights. The former lacks volume and the latter lacks
force. But there is a third class of
opponents of the rights of the individual under the Constitution who have
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force and can muster the whole volume
of the last named contingent. They
are the professional type of intellectuals. They neither oppose nor ignore
the Constitution but compass and
imagine the evisceration of Constitutional limitations on so-called "social
grounds."
They must, therefore, be properly
recognized as the most efficient antagonists of the individualistic character
of American law.
Nor should this inherent hostility
of idea and ideal be doubted because
of a kiss they occasionally bestow upon traditional constitutional principles
as a matter of history. The school of
present abstract intelligentia
proclaims that man was made for the
state, the constitutionalist that the
state was made for man.
In a warfare of these ideas there is
no quarter. It must follow either that
our fathers were right in regarding
certain principles of right and wrong
to be eternally and universally binding
on government with only their correct
application as a proper subject for
controversy; or else so-called social
interest is the real end of government.
In the latter case the founders of the
Constitution were wrong; that document was only an historical incidentinspiring but past; and our present
form of government is inferior to those
under both British and Continental
Jurisprudence, but particularly the latter.
In view of the enormous intellectual
reputation of some of the luminaries
in the van of the societary school it
would certainly be presumptuous in
the writer of this article to venture into the lists against such Goliaths armed only with the sling shot of a simple
traditional education. He certainly entertains no purpose of such temerity.
Nearly all arguments of this phase of
governmental philosophy attempt a
comprehensive demonstration but end
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by proving nothing so conclusively as
Schopenhauer's suggestion that after
all "the intellect is only the foreign
minister of the will." In recognition
of which we point out, as regards the
pedagogic attack, that not one of its
leaders, brilliant though they are, ever
had the practical experience of measuring a dollar in terms of sweat or
risk of enterprise.
It is not to be attempted either to
convert or- refute these doctrinaires
but simply to examine their doctrines
from the standpoint of old line thought.
Since the particular societary doctrine we have under discussion is, in
its present state of exposition, found
in the expression of numbers of persons it is peculiarly adaptable from
our standpoint to inductive treatment.
We are interested in its legal and
particularly its constitutional concepts.
They appear most frequently in the
judicial opinions, magazine articles
and lectures of the judges and law professors who are its proponents. To be
understood they should be followed
through.
1. The anti-individualistic approach
to the constitutional question from
which we learn
2. The anti-individualistic expressi-on of the relation of (1) supra to
human collectivity as variously denominated "Society," "the Community,"
"the Public" and its resultant phenomena, the "State" and "Public Opinion;"
whence appears
3. The anti-individual belief as to
the nature of municipal law. On this
occasion space will permit the consideration only of the first.
Constitutionalists approach a question on the Constitution like any other
legal question of interpretation and
construction-reading it by context,
history and analogy to decided cases
through logical processes aided by traditional ethics. The societarian pro-
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ceeds from a totally different angle.
The following expressions are characteristic of Mr. Justice Holmes, the
most eminent judicial exponent of the
deconstitutionalizing doctrine under
discussion:
In one case:
"I think that the word "liberty,"
in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said
that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law .....
The accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar,
or novel, and even shocking, ought
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States."
And in one of his most recent opinions:
"The constitutional requirement
of compensation when property is
taken cannot be pressed to its
grammatical extreme . . . . police
power often is used in a wide
sense to cover and, as I said, to
apologize for the general power
of the legislature to make a part
of the community uncomfortable
by a change.
I do not believe in such apologies. I think the proper course is
to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit
to do unless it is restrained by
some express prohibition in the
Constitution of the United States
or of the State, and that Courts
should be careful not to extend
such prohibitions beyond their
obvious meaning by reading into
them conceptions of public policy

that the particular Court may
happen to entertain."
These expressions are dulcet, assured, precise and plausible. Let us
make some attempt at analysis. The
party claiming constitutional rights is
told in substance in the first statement:
1. That no law is unconstitutional if
supportable to a fair man upon the
criterion of tradition.
2. That no law is unconstitutional
though shocking to a judge from the
standpoint of tradition.
and in the latter statement
3. That no law is unconstitutional
unless it violates the letter of the Constitution.
4. That the Constitution is not to be
interpreted grammatically by letter.
If anyone regards this as a mere verbal dilemma his mind will be readily
disabused by studying its application.
Constitutional "tradition" is a veritable chameleon in the hands of a judge
determined to sustain the validity of
some guise of sovereign oppression.
If the particular eruption, however iniquitous, has any semblance of precedent, it is conclusively saved by
"tradition." If it is an outrage on all
precedent, its "shocking" novelty is
not to be permitted to weigh in the
mind of the judge. A few years ago,
in a literally ex parte civil suit, a
westerner was despoiled of several
hundred thousands of dollars of property constituting all his worldly possessions without a vestige of a hearing
in fact or theory by a hideous quirk
in the Delaware "attachment" law so
malodorous that the legislature itself
repealed it on the strength of the case.
It was judicially sustained on some
extremely ancient rules of the city of
London, i. e. "tradition."
On the other hand the rent regulations of a few years ago were an exact
logical counter-part of the Colonial
stay laws judicially damned as an ele-
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mentary fact of constitutional history
and tradition and against which the
"impairment" clause was directed by
express language and known historical
intent of the framers. These traditional considerations were as less than
nothing in the mind of the Jheringist
jurist.
Much the same may be said of the
convenience of the "express" character of constitutional limitations. As
regards either example above put,
neither the manifest lack of "due process" in ihe one case, nor the admitted
"taking of property for public use without compensation" in the other, is, it
appears, to allow enforcing the express
language to "its grammatical extreme."
Yet if it was suggested that the Delaware law was plain robbery under
forms of procedure and the other a
recognizable form of political jobbery
designed to make the state the professional foot-pad for the noisy exponents of an electorally important class
on the most elementary
-unsound
economic theory and more immoral
and unjust than petty larceny because
more cowardly, the same learned jurist
would say that no ethical or economic
view could be read into the express
language of the Constitution.
The anti-individualistic constitutional
expression in individual rights is summed up, therefore, in the old stanza
"You will if you will, you will if
you won't;
Your damned if you do, and
damned if you don't."
And so much is this true that the
brainiest lawyer in the United States
of any creed of doctrine is defied to
express a priori and in terms of legal
principles the view of the societarian
judge on any constitutional question.
He knows, to be sure, that the constitutionality of almost any act will be
sustained; but he cannot tell why in
casual language intelligible to the profession.
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Space will not permit an extended
discussion of other characteristic attributes of the collectivist approach to
the constitutional question, further
than to state that like the one last discussed they are all elaborately calculated to prevent, in the alleged inter'
est of so-called "society" a control of
judicial determination by concepts previously known.
With this view their expressions
almost invariably woo the general and
the abstract and shun the concrete.
As a corollary to this few cases are
cited and none subjected to close analysis. And indeed, in view of the other
aspects of the matter any other course
would and does lead to some surprising situations.
For instance, in the rent cases, vent
was given to the concrete comparison
that since the legislature might limit
the vertical dimension of a building it
should have the right to regulate the
rents in the building.
The astonishing conception of the
learned judge seems to be that the
sovereign interest inheres ipso facto
in the subject of height. If a sign
board is high and rents are high and
they can take down the height of the
sign board they can take down the
height of rents. In this view the first
legislator must have been Procustes.
The somewhat novel view may not
be undeserving of serious consideration. It certainly opens interesting
vistas for future legislative activity on
the subject of Snakes Hips, and
Women's Dresses.
Another characteristic of the anticonstitutional approach is the petitio
principii on a major scale. It is unfortunate that this particular characteristic cannot be developed at some
length but by way of exemplification
one may direct attention to a statement by Dean Pound in his lectures on
the Spirit of the Common Law:
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"The conception of law as a securing of interests or a protecting
of relations has all but universally superseded the individualist
theory."
The attitude of finality in this generality must leave one with a traditional education actually gasping.
As a mere fleeting instance of the
same argumentative aspect in the
same work, Judge Steven J. Field is
referred to as a leader in a "belated
individualist crusade."
This is reminiscent of nothing so
much as the modus arguendi of the
great Parliamentarian Thadeus Stevens in his references to "the late Andy
Johnson."
A last aspect of the social approach
is its preference for an adjudication
wherein the Judge as a person consciously makes and molds the law
than for one where the Court as a theoretical entity purports to find it.
Extreme' as these characterizations
appear to be it is thought that they
do not overstate the processual doctrines of the class under discussion as
appears by explicit statement in its
own expressions. We understand it
to be not only designed on the part of
the societarian but to be recognized as
designed and openly proclaimed by
teachers of that school, who look with
great complacency upon the policy as
an important prerequisite to social experiment.
In cutting loose from theories of a
preexisting state of law and avowedly,
or in effect, establishing a new law
predicated upon current judicial instinct, Dean Pound professes to sense
one of the most beneficent legal institutions of the present day which he
frankly and unblushingly designates
"Judicial Empiricism." The adjective
"empirical" is normally used in a
somewhat derogatory connotation. But

in this case It is simply another of the
numerous paradoxes we have already
encountered.
In fairness to the harbingers of social
reform it should be said that attempt
is made to substantiate the experimental character of judicial empiricism in
current practice by a number of specific instances. In fairness to the contrary view it should be said that the
probative force, from all angles, of the
incidents elucidated has yet to be subjected to analysis and attack.
Since, however, the collectivist himself does not attempt to justify upon
traditional standards, the procedural
as distinguished from the substantive
basis of his views but allows his procedure to be dictated by supposed
policies of "social interest" as its only
ground, we may perhaps in conclusion,
and without offence roughly delineate
the procedural rules of anti-individualistic adjudication as requiring that
it should, on principle, be meaningless
as precedent and cultivate judicial
know nothingism as conscious policy.
Nor is it a style to be scorned as a
forensic weapon. It has all the fighting qualities of Uncle Remus' Tar
baby. It may have to yield at every
point of concentrated attack but when
judicially announced it still can stick
and smear.
Judicial empiricism expects the
judge to "snatch a grace beyond the
reach of art" in supposed "social interest". Ancient good and economic
principles might run counter to "the
dominant opinion" as to the needs of
society and hence the judge cannot
know as law either the ten commandments or the operations of supply and
demand. A learned societarian has
jestingly remarked that he was once
likened to Pontius Pilate. But in this
at least the comparison has a semblance of merit: "He asked, "What is
Truth?", but would not stay for an
answer."
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K.X.P.U.
Hark, hark! I hear
The strain of Strutting chanticleer,
Cry, cock-a-doodle-doo.
Ferdinand: Where should this music be? i' the air, or the earth?
It sounds no more:-and sure it waits upon
Some god of the island. Sitting on a bank,
Weeping again the king my father's wrack,
This music crept by me upon the waters;
Allaying both their fury, and my passion,
With its sweet air: thence I have follow'd it,
Or hath it drawn me rather:-But 'tis gone.
No, it begins again.
Ariel sings.
The Tempest, Act I, Scene II.

Ariel:

The same Shakespeare said "All the world's a stage", but now my dial
reads that all the world's a neutrostage. And the skrinking lawyer,
once so timid he would not advertise his noodle wares in the daily
press, now soldier bold, full of strange oaths, jealous in honour, sudden
and quick in quarrel, seeking the bubble reputation even in the microphone's mouth, takes the air, and tells us of unusual cases he has tried.
It is too much. The sooner the Newspaper brings on KOA and the National Circuit, the better for us all.
Poor Richard.

Communications
The Denver Bar Association Record,
Denver, Colorado.
Gentlemen:
You may be interested in a further
addition to the bibliography on -the
quotation, "The Law is a Jealous Mistress." Mrs. Hammond of The Carson
Press (which published our American
Bar Association number of The Jealous Mistress at the time I was editor)
has referred me to a quotation from
Thackeray's "The Virginians," in chapter XV of the second volume, which
reads as follows:
"Though not so exacting as she
since has become-though she allowed her disciples much more
leisure, much more pleasure, much
more punch, much more frequenting of coffee-houses and holiday-

making, than she admits nowadays, when she scarce gives her
votaries time for amusement, recreation, instruction, sleep, or dinner-the Law a hundred years
ago was still a jealous mistress,
and demanded a pretty exclusive
attention."
"The Virginians" was written between the years 1857 and 1859, which
places this quotation, among the definite written quotations so far discovered, as junior only to that of Judge
Story's in "The Value and Improvement of Legal Studies," where the
quotation is also used. This latter essay, contained in "Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story," published in
1852, appears to be the first instance
of the quotation as yet definitely located in written form.
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My own impression would be that
it was unlikely that Thackeray would
have read a comparatively obscure
essay of Judge Story written a few
years previous, and that the original
coinage of the phrase by both Story
and Thackeray, and possibly, also, by
Judge Sharswood, who is said to have
used the same phrase in his Introduction to his edition of Blackstone in
1859, was an unlikely coincidence. I
would, therefore, infer that therA was
probably some earlier use of the quotation which has not been definitely
located and which may have been
merely in the form of an unwritten
proverb.
Very respectfully,
OLIVER W.
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The Denver Bar Association Record,
Denver, Colorado.
Gentlemen:
I was interested in reading the sentence imposed by Judge Kirby Benedict, of Taos County, New Mexico, upon Jose Maria Martin, published in
the August number of the Bar Association Record.
A sequel to the sentence imposed by
Judge Benedict upon the prisoner in
1858 to the effect that Jose Maria Martin escaped from the county jail after
sentence, and several years afterward,
met his death, in Lincoln County, New
Mexico, by falling backward out of a
wagon and breaking his neck.
Yours truly,
HARRY C.

TOLL

RIDDLE

Legal Ethics Opinions
No. 1
HE Committee on Professional
Ethics reports the following
statements of questions submitted to it in respect of professional conduct and its opinion thereon:
STATEMENT
I am a Denver attorney and would
inquire whether in the opinion of your
Committee it would be unprofessional
for me, at the request of attorneys of
another state, to furnish an affidavit
to be used in the disbarment proceedings pending against an attorney of
that state. Such affidavit would set
forth the details of unprofessional conduct of which the accused attorney
has been guilty in connection with litigation under his direction against my
client in Colorado. The offense to be
covered by the affidavit is not itself
included among the offenses charged
But
in the disbarment proceeding.
disbarment would probably inure to
the benefit of my client by putting a
stop to the litigation against it.

OPINION
Assuming that the affidavit in
question is sought by persons properly
initiating or prosecuting the disbarment proceedings it is the opinion of
the Committee that to furnish it would
not be unprofessional; and that No.
29 of the Canons of Ethics recommended by the Supreme Court, which provides that
"Lawyers should expose without
fear or favor before proper tribunals
corrupt or dishonest conduct in the
profession," conclusively answers the
inquiry.

No. 2
STATEMENT
To the Committee:
I am enclosing three questions
which I would appreciate if your Committee would rule upon at its convenience.
A. Is it ethical for a lawyer to accept a retainer or fee from persons, corporations, or organiza-
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tions interested in the result of
an election, as compensation for
making public addresses or writing communications for publication for the purpose of influencing voters to vote at the election
in accordance with the interests
or wishes of the lawyer's employer?
B. If Question A is answered in the
affirmative, should the lawyer
when making such addresses or
writing such communications disclose fully his employment and
his employer?
C. Would it affect the answers to
A. or B. of the matter to be voted
upon directly affects the interests
of a particular business and the
lawyer is the regular attorney for
that business and not specially
employed for the purpose of that
campaign?
OPINION
In the opinion of the Committee the
answer to Question A is Yes, but this
answer should be qualified by the answer to Question B. which is also Yes.
To Question C the answer is No.
See Canon 26 of the ethical code
recommended by the Supreme Court.
Such advocacy differs in no respect
in principle from a lawyer's lobbying
for or against a measure before a
legislative body. A lawyer "must not
prostitute his professional standing by
exerting an influence in the guise of
good citizenship while concealing the
fact that he is employed to promote or
to defeat the measure in question."
Jessup, Professional Ideals, 56.

No. 3
STATEMENT
To the Committee on Professional
Ethics:
Will you please answer the following questions:

RECORD

Is it ethical for an attorney at
law to give free legal advice over
the radio?
2. Is it ethical for an attorney at
law to give free legal advice
through the daily press?
1.

Is it ethical for an attorney at
law to invite questions over such
channels that he will answer gratuitously?
4. Would it make any difference in
any of the instances mentioned
that the attorney was paid for
giving such free advice?
5. Would it be improper advertising
in any of the cases mentioned?
3.

OPINION
In the opinion of the Committee
Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 must be answered in the negative, Question 5 in
the affirmative.
The practice about which the inquiries are made, necessarily involves
the advertising that is so subversive
of professional ideals. But it is especially objectionable, so far as it consists of advising concerning the legal
rights of persons to whom the attorney
does not sustain a professional relation.
The Committee does not pass on
the propriety of contributions to the
newspapers on general legal subjects.
Secretary Hoover announces that we
have recovered from the war. True,
the five-cent cigar is back, but where is
the freelunch counter?-Minneapolis
Journal.
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Recent Trial Court Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It is intended in
each issue of the Record to note interesting current decisions of all local
Trial Courts, including the United
States District Court, State District
Courts. the County Court, and the Justice Courts. The co-operation of the
members of the Bar Is solicited In makIng this department a success. Any attorney having knowledge of such a
decision is requested to phone or mail
the title of the case to Victor Arthur
Miller, who will digest the decision for
this department. The names of the
Courts having no material for the current month will be omitted, due to
lack of space.)
Denver District Court
DIVISION 7
JUDGE FRANK McDONOUGH, SR.
In the matter of the application of
Benjamin Sugarman for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Facts: In January, 1925, judgment
entered against petitioner in the District Court of Denver for $5,000.00, and
he was found guilty of malice and
committed to Denver County Jail for
one year. Defendant left jurisdiction
and was brought back from Pennsylvania in 1927 on a manslaughter
charge for which bail was fixed and
given in the sum of $1,000.00. While
in the County Jail the defendant was
further detained by the Sheriff because of issuance of body execution in
the civil case. Petitioner contended
he was unlawfully deprived of his
liberty and so he seeks benefit of
Habeas Corpus writ.
Question: Can one who has been
brought involuntarily within the jurisdiction plead the privilege of immunity from service of process.

Held: Writ of Habeas Corpus denied
and prisoner remanded to the custody
of the Sheriff.
Reasoning: District Court had already obtained jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and had lawfully
entered judgment against him.
By
departing from the state he did not
oust the court of jurisdiction.
(69
Colo. 567)
One Division of the District Court cannot review the proceedings of another Division.
Supreme Court Library
The Supreme Court Library has received since January 1, 1927, 1150
volumes.
We now have all the official reports
of the State Appellate courts, the
United States Courts and Commissions, and the latest compilations of
statutes, codes and digests of all the
States in the Union together with all
the latest session laws. Our foreign
reports, statutes and digests of all the
English speaking countries are very
nearly complete. Recent additions to
these are the Commonwealth Law Reports of Australia, New Zealand Law
Reports, Porto Rico Supreme Court
reports, Porto Rico Federal Reports,
Alaska Reports, and Canadian Reports
complete.
Our files of "search books", special
reports, the National Reporter system
and digests, and Shepards' Citations
are complete.
Legal periodicals in bound volumes
and complete digests to date include:
Albany Law Journal, American Lam
Register, American Law Review, Yale
Law Review, Harvard Law Review,
Pennsylvania Law Review, Central
Law Journal, Columbia Law Review,
Illinois Law Review, Michigan Law
Review, Criminal Law Magazine and
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Reporter, Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, and Law Quarterly Review of Canada.

tion guarantees a cullud man the right
to be a Democrat, but don't guarantee
a Democrat nothing'.-Dallas News.

Our text books now exceed 5000
volumes.
Some of the latest are:
Bancroft-Whitney's Code Pleading in

I

.

Law Student

L

Western States; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edition; Foulke,
Federal Income Tax; Jones on Evidence, 2nd Edition; Mason's U. S.

Code, Annotated;

S

and Stenographer desires po-I
sition in reputable
1
law office
l

Montgomery, Fed-

eral Jurisdiction and Procedure, 3rd
Edition; Page on Wills, 2nd Edition;
Pinkerton & Millsap, Inheritance and
Estate Taxes; Thompson on Corporations, 1927 Edition.
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c.T good Client
of the Bar acting as attorneys
for estates in cases where a bank is executor or administrator find a financial institution to be a good client.
MEMBERS

The bank's officers are experienced, understand the business in hand, are always available and appreciate the importance of legal
service. Matters of accounting, colledions,
and other business details of which counsel
are glad to be relieved are attended to by
the bank. The combination of a good lawyer and an experienced trust department
produces the best possible administration.
At each of the undersigned banks it is an
established policy that the attorney who
draws the will designating the bank in a
fiduciary capacity shall be chosen as attorney for the estate.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY

THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
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